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Coasean Fictions: Law and Economics Revisited 
Alejandro Nadal1 
 
After the 1960s, a strong academic movement developed in the United 
States around the idea that the study of the law, as well as legal practice, 
could be strengthened through economic analysis.2  This trend was started 
through the works of R.H. Coase and Guido Calabresi, and grew with later 
developments introduced by Richard Posner and Robert D. Cooter, as well 
as Gary Becker.3  Law and Economics (L&E) is the name given to the 
application of modern economics to legal analysis and practice. 
Proponents of L&E have portrayed the movement as improving clarity 
and logic in legal analysis, and even as a tool to modify the conceptual 
categories used by lawyers and courts to think about legal problems.4  In the 
most extreme interpretation of L&E, the tools of microeconomic analysis 
are seen as allowing legal analysis to identify which laws have greater 
merits for society.5  The supporters of this academic movement assume it 
allows for a clearer understanding of the process through which inefficient 
laws are discarded while efficient legislation is enacted and implemented.6 
As an academic movement, L&E has had significant influence on 
contract law, torts, criminal law, environmental legislation, privatization, 
deregulation, and natural resource management, as well as many other 
dimensions of relevance for the application of law and adjudication in legal 
disputes.  Posner, for example, has promoted the application of the main 
tenets of L&E to the law of contracts through the concept of efficient breach 
of contracts.7  In fact, Posner thinks that the law should be designed to 
ensure that assets and opportunities are in the hands of those who can and 
would pay most to have them. 
The underlying premise of L&E is that economic theory has succeeded in 
providing a solid foundation for the idea that competitive markets allocate 
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resources efficiently.8  The purported rigor of economic analysis is 
perceived to be linked to the basic theoretical contributions of economic 
theory.  It is clear that supporters of L&E firmly believe that economic 
theory is a solid scientific edifice producing results that can be readily used, 
and in many cases, translated to the realm of the legal profession. 
For some analysts, applying economic analysis to the study of law poses 
a significant challenge to more conventional approaches.  For example, 
Kornhauser thinks that economic analysis of law is disquieting because 
explaining normativity is a central pre-occupation of the philosophy of law, 
but the model of self-interested maximization of preferences does not admit 
a concept of normativity.9  According to Kornhauser, the logic of this 
commitment to self-interested maximization of preferences appears to 
imply a denial of the need for a distinct concept of law in the explanation 
and evaluation of social institutions.10 
The juxtaposition of justice—or ethics—versus efficiency is also a 
problematic question.  For example, Egger thinks that efficiency cannot 
serve as a substitute for ethics.11  Likewise, Arnold embraces the idea that 
the “criterion of the marketplace (as efficiency has been called)” and the 
ethics-based criterion are really very different in their essential 
characteristics, and in their consequences, when used to determine 
adjudication.12  The bottom line for him is that the law must at least be 
perceived as fair—not just efficient—in order to maintain social stability.13  
Ultimately, the central issue is that economic analysis conceives human 
conduct as being part of a system of relations in which there is no room for 
ethical considerations.  In economic theory, markets make the plans of 
selfish individuals mutually compatible, but economic laws are imposed on 
agents without their knowing about them.  For example, in the theoretical 
constructs of modern economics, agents may ignore the contents of the law 
of supply and demand, but they will eventually suffer its effects and will 
have to act accordingly.  They have no inter personal choices to make—
they only have to select the bundles of commodities that maximize their 
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satisfaction.  This is why there is no room for deliberation on justice or 
ethics in economic theory.  Agents do not ask questions about the ethical 
nature of their acts.  There are simply different allocation schemes—some 
are considered “efficient,” while others are not.  L&E is just a way of 
subordinating legal institutions to the dictates of modern economic theory, a 
discourse that claims to be scientific in nature.  
Although these considerations may imply a critique of L&E, the 
underlying premise concerning the scientific soundness of economic theory 
is not questioned.  The critical analysis presented in this article takes a 
different tack.  This article examines the theoretical shortcomings of 
modern economic analysis and illustrates the implications for L&E.  This 
paper is concerned with the poverty of results attained by modern economic 
theory in its quest for a scientific explanation of markets and their 
dynamics, and how this undermines the basic tenets of L&E.  The objective 
is not to criticize the lack of realism of some of the assumptions and 
restrictions found in the theoretical discourse of economics, but rather to 
expose the logical incoherence of modern economic theory.  In doing so, 
we14 will unravel some of the critical limitations of L&E and show that faith 
in the scientific robustness of economic theory is misplaced.15  Contrary to 
what advocates of L&E assert, modern economic theory is in poor shape, 
and the mainstream research program, centered on general equilibrium 
theory, is a dead-end street. 
In the first section of this article we examine the underlying assumptions 
of Coase’s Theorem, establishing its links with the theory of a bilateral 
monopoly.  This section analyzes the implications of the indeterminacy of 
contract first identified by Edgeworth in the case of a bilateral monopoly.  
The second section focuses on the relationship between the Coase Theorem 
and n-commodity models.  More precisely, the analysis centers on the scope 
of the Coase Theorem and the limitations of general equilibrium theory.  
These limitations stem from the inability of the theory to deliver robust and 
scientifically sound results to the critical question of how equilibrium prices 
572 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
CRITICAL EXAMINATIONS OF FREE TRADE THEORY 
are formed.  In the final section we summarize our main conclusions.  
Throughout, the role of mathematics is touched upon. 
I.   COASE’S THEOREM 
Ronald Coase, an English economist working at the University of 
Chicago, was awarded the 1991 Nobel Prize in economics for his 
contributions on transactions costs and their relevance to institutions.  
Interestingly, it was not Coase, but another economist named George 
Stigler, who coined the phrase “the Coase Theorem,” stating that “under 
perfect competition, private and social costs will be equal.”16  This 
statement essentially means that with zero transaction costs, rights for the 
use of factors of production will be exchanged until the value of production 
is maximized.  
According to Coase,  
[i]f rights to perform certain actions can be bought and sold, they 
will tend to be acquired by those for whom they are most valuable 
either for production or enjoyment.  In this process, rights will be 
acquired, subdivided, and combined, so as to allow those actions to 
be carried out which bring about that outcome which has the 
greatest value on the market.17   
A typical example illustrating this process is the case of a factory 
polluting neighboring fields.  In that example, the conventional economist’s 
remedy is to impose restrictions on the factory’s owner and to force 
payment to redress damages, but Coase argues against this solution because 
it may lead to socially inefficient outcomes.18  By this, Coase means that in 
the absence of transaction costs, people can always negotiate without cost to 
trade rights whenever this leads to increases in the value of production. 
A.  Zero-Cost Assumption 
Foregoing or negotiating these trade rights to others must match the costs 
of carrying out the transactions required—the new allocation of rights will 
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be attained only if the cost of the transactions needed to achieve that 
outcome is less than the increase in value that such rearrangement makes 
possible.19  The use of the term “greatest value” in this context is a direct 
reference to the maximization of welfare, or utility, in general equilibrium 
analysis.  In general, the term “efficiency” refers to Pareto-optimality or its 
variant, Hick-Kaldor efficiency, and pertains to economic circumstances in 
which no one can be made better off without someone else being made 
worse off.20 
From the point of view of efficiency, and when transaction costs are zero, 
“the ultimate result (which maximizes the value of production) is 
independent of the legal system” or the initial allocation of rights.21  This 
statement epitomizes the Coase Theorem, and Stigler first formulated it as 
such.22  Coase has expressed concern over the fact that the transaction costs 
assumption plays such a critical role: “the world of zero transaction costs… 
is the world of modern economic analysis, and economists therefore feel 
quite comfortable handling the intellectual problem it poses, remote from 
the real world though they may be.”23  Coase states that he is more 
concerned with the problems of the real world, where transaction costs are 
positive.24 
This appears to put the question of realism—or lack thereof—firmly in 
the center of the debate: although the real world with positive transaction 
costs is more interesting, under the restrictive assumption of zero 
transaction costs, the Coase Theorem holds true.  However, as will be seen 
later, upholding this statement is a risky proposition.  In fact, there is no 
rational foundation for this conjecture. 
First, consider a situation that consists of two agents and two 
commodities.25  The most important examples used by Coase correspond to 
what is known in economic theory as the case of a bilateral monopoly: trade 
that takes place between two agents in a two-commodity economy.  
Between the two agents, they own the entire stock of the two commodities; 
thus, there is no competition from other owners of these commodities.  In 
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these models, the entire available stock of the two commodities is allocated 
between the two agents.  Hovenkamp states that in these cases, economic 
efficiency cannot be proven on ordinarily neoclassical premises.26 
The case of a bilateral monopoly, then, covers a very unique and perhaps 
less interesting example that perfectly illustrates the flaws in Coase’s 
theorem.  For one thing, because there are only two commodities involved, 
a bilateral monopoly excludes the possibility of arbitraging between several 
commodities, a point we will return to below.  It is important to bear in 
mind that any meaningful discussion regarding economic efficiency and its 
theoretical foundations needs to be considered in the framework of richer 
and more complex cases.  That point is indeed covered by n-commodity 
models and is examined by general equilibrium theory.  At this initial stage, 
however, it is important to examine the nature of the problem posed by 
Coase in terms of the theory of a bilateral monopoly.  
Figure 1 is a graphic description of the situation through an Edgeworth 
Box.  Here, W is the initial allocation of commodities M and N between 
agents I and II.27  The indifference curves, meeting at point W, mark the 
boundaries of the transactions: for Agent I (respective to Agent II), any 
point to the left (respective to the right-hand side of the figure) of the 
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Figure 1 
Coase’s Theorem, Multiple Equilibria, and a Bilateral Monopoly 
 
 
Prices are rates of substitution between the two commodities and are 
dictated by the slope of straight lines going through point W.  For example, 
if the new allocation is x, the straight line connecting Wx corresponds to the 
price at which the deal was closed.  Evidently, in that case the price of 
commodity M was rather high, explaining why Agent I would give up a 
large share of his initial stock of commodity N and obtain a relatively low 
amount of commodity M in return.  The price of M, in terms of N, was 
higher than if the deal had been closed at point Y. 
The set of points in the curve AB corresponds to points where the 
indifference curves of the agents are tangent—that is, where the 
indifference curves of both agents have the same slope.  The locus of such 
points is called the contract curve because once agents reach one of those 
points, there are no new trading options that are mutually beneficial.  
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Efficiency is attained on the contract curve AB because utility 
maximization conditions are simultaneously met for both agents.  All points 
in the contract curve are equilibrium points: on the contract curve both 
agents will refuse entering new negotiations because the ratios of the 
marginal utilities of each agent will be equal.  On the contract curve there 
are no advantages to be gained by entering into new contracts, and thus, 
there are no incentives for further trade: the two-agent economy is in 
equilibrium. 
B.  Multiple Equilibria, Efficiency, and Collapse 
Coase and his followers have stated that where agents can trade freely the 
outcome will be an efficient one.  Edgeworth’s analysis reveals that there 
are multiple efficient solutions to the problem of bilateral monopolies: 
every point in the contract curve is an efficient solution (i.e., Pareto-
efficient allocations).  Thus, in the simplest case of a bilateral monopoly, 
the final settlement agreed upon lies somewhere on the contract curve, but 
where exactly it will lie cannot be ascertained beforehand.29 
Edgeworth asks the following question: why should an isolated pair of 
traders exchange every portion of their commodities at the same price?30  If 
mutually advantageous exchanges are allowed, there is a trajectory towards 
a point of the contract curve, but the final equilibrium is path-dependent.  At 
each stage, trade occurs over a portion of the stock of each commodity.  
Allocations change and, at every new exchange, the relevant segment of the 
contract curve is determined by the new set of indifference curves that cross 
through the point representing the new allocation. 
Ultimately, the point of arrival on the contract curve depends on the 
negotiating abilities of both agents.  For example, if Agent I offers to 
change the allocation and move to point Y, Agent II may or may not want 
to do this.  Agent II may see that if he or she accepts the gains made by 
Agent I, then the resulting position would be disproportionately higher in 
comparison to his or her own gains (as shown by the movement to a much 
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higher indifference curve for Agent I).  The reciprocal applies for Agent II 
with respect to point X.  It is important to emphasize the fact that the 
negotiating process is based solely on maximization functions; nothing in 
this model allows us to expect the two agents will continue bargaining once 
they have reached a point on the contract curve. 
An interesting aspect of this was first noted by Samuelson: at any point 
off the contract curve, there is a movement back toward the contract 
curve—a movement that improves the position of both agents—but in many 
cases of bilateral monopolies, a final equilibrium may be reached off the 
contract curve.31  The explanation is that one or both agents involved in 
Edgeworth’s box may be unwilling to discuss the possibility of making a 
mutually favorable movement for fear that the discussion may imperil the 
existing tolerable status quo.32  
Coase dismisses the problem, claiming that the contention is “difficult to 
understand.”33  In a sense, this is true.  Under the conditions and 
assumptions of the Edgeworth box, given an initial status quo, the 
indifference curve going through the point marking the initial allocation 
defines the boundaries of acceptable negotiations between the agents (and 
the relevant segment of the contract curve).  No deal will be accepted 
outside these bounds.  Also, if the model involves the usual assumptions, 
agents will continue their calculations and offers of possible contracts until 
a point on the contract curve is attained. 
What happens when we allow for exchanges outside the contract curve 
but inside the lentil defined by the agents’ indifference curves going 
through point W?  This is an open possibility for the Coase Theorem and 
can be accommodated within the framework of the Edgeworth box.  In a 
Coasean world, it appears that agents carry out negotiations without actual 
trading until they strike a deal.  Presumably, the deal is closed when both 
parties are satisfied and their indifference curves are tangent.  What 
happens, however, if agents find a trading opportunity that mutually 
improves their positions but is outside of the contract curve?  Consider, for 
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example, the change from the initial allocation W to point H: this trade 
improves the agents’ positions (both move to higher indifference curves), 
and it therefore makes sense to strike a deal that is mutually beneficial.  
However, the new allocation is not socially efficient.  The interesting point 
here is that once trade has taken place, the new allocation may be 
irreversible.  For example, when consumption and/or production actually 
occur, commodities and inputs are transformed.  In a Coasean example, 
suppose two parties accept a transaction of rights and as a consequence a 
stream is polluted and fish die.  If the resulting allocation of rights is 
mutually beneficial but is not on the contract curve, the Coase Theorem 
does not hold.34 
The ultimate question is whether negotiations will collapse.  This is a 
question of theoretical importance and empirical relevance, especially in the 
context of L&E.  Cooter seems to believe that the bargaining process to 
reach a suitable deal is inherently unstable and may collapse, even with zero 
transaction costs.35  The truth is that agents in the model operate through 
maximization functions, and nothing prepares them for the case where the 
initial offer is rejected.  The model is basically static and does not reproduce 
the dynamics of negotiations.  This is why the model does not tell us where 
on the contract curve the process ends.  It is clear that agents can refuse 
bids, potentially bringing the process to a halt.  In actual practice, this may 
happen as agents try to rearrange the allocation of their rights through trade.  
If the process collapses, the agents will not reach points on the contract 
curve.  All of this is independent of the transaction costs.  The point raised 
by Samuelson—that equilibrium may be reached off the contract curve—
has been neglected by the L&E debate.  
Although efficiency can be attained if we assume a deal will be settled at 
a point on the contract curve, there still exists a difficult ethical issue.  A 
stronger agent will certainly take advantage of the weaknesses of the other 
agent and reap a much higher benefit.  For example, in Coase’s classic 
example, the railroad company may have more information or may outlast 
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the farmer, and the deal will be lopsided in favor of the railway’s owners.36  
The unevenness is more serious when the asymmetries in negotiating 
capabilities are more significant.  For example, the railroad company may 
be able to outwait the other party as it tries to determine a solution.  In the 
end, the railroad and the farmer might reach a “mutually beneficial 
arrangement,” but the benefits will most certainly be concentrated on one 
side of the table. 
C.  Invariance 
The existence of multiple equilibria raises yet another problem.  In 
Coase’s own words, the “ultimate result (which maximizes the value of 
production) is independent of the legal position if the pricing system is 
assumed to work without cost.”37  In the same breath, Coase asserts that the 
“long-run equilibrium position” is the same whether the business is held 
responsible or not.38  Thus, Coase affirms the “reciprocal nature of the 
problem,” meaning that both sides will negotiate and reach an agreement 
that will be efficient and invariant to the underlying legal rule.39  But 
multiple equilibrium positions mean there is no unique long-run 
equilibrium.  It also means, as is illustrated by the Edgeworth box, that 
agents will have incentives to engage in strategic behavior and this will 
influence the end result.  Thus, there is no reason to expect that the result 
will be invariant. 
It should be noted that the definition of the invariance component not 
only eschews the distributional question that we have examined here, but 
also does not make any economic sense.  Take the example presented by 
Coase, in which ranchers own cattle that stray into farmland and destroy 
crops.40  In one case the ranchers are held liable, while in the other they are 
not.41  According to Coase, the end result is the same: in one instance, the 
ranchers must pay for the damage done, while in the other, the farmers 
would be “willing to pay (up to) the value of the damage to induce the 
cattle-raiser to stop it, so that for the cattle-raiser to continue his operations 
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and bring about this crop damage would mean foregoing this sum.”42  Here 
it should be noted that for the farmer, this is a typical lose-lose situation: 
whether he absorbs the damages or buys the right of ranchers to do damage, 
he suffers a loss.  On the other hand, this is a typical win-win situation from 
the perspective of the rancher: his cattle can forage on other lands and 
damage crops, or he can receive income (up to) the value of the meat he 
could produce with the cattle feeding on land that is not his.  For farmers 
there is a real cost, while ranchers merely forego the sum in question.  
The critical issue here is that there is no reason to expect that negotiations 
will lead to the same result regardless of the initial distribution of rights.  In 
fact, there is no reason to expect that the end result will always be the same.  
The Edgeworth box framework helps clarify this: every point in the relevant 
interval of the contract curve is a candidate for the conclusion of the deal.  
The end point depends on how negotiations define a new trajectory every 
time the process starts.  Thus, there is no reason to expect that invariance 
follows when things such as liabilities are determined in different forms. 
Multiplicity of equilibria raises serious distributional questions that 
cannot be shunted aside.  From the perspective of equity and fairness, the 
Coase Theorem is called into question because if there are gains from trade, 
the distribution may be severely lopsided.  Upholding the theorem comes at 
a very high cost because from the perspective of ethics, the law is more 
concerned with fairness than with efficiency.  Market theory, on the other 
hand, is interested in efficiency and is not disturbed by questions of 
fairness.43  Sustaining the Coase Theorem transforms fairness into just 
another commodity.  From an ethics perspective, the theorem becomes 
meaningless. 
In economic theory, competitive markets are those in which agents are 
passive with respect to prices (i.e., they are price-takers).44  In the case of a 
bilateral monopoly, on the other hand, agents may make offers and modify 
them, thereby actively changing the prices at which the deal can be closed.  
In this sense, a bilateral monopoly is not a competitive market.  However, 
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as we have seen, efficiency is attained when points on the contract curve are 
reached.  The problem is that it is precisely because agents actively change 
prices—and adopt a strategic behavior—that distributional questions arise.  
Cooter is misguided in stating that whenever non-competitive markets arise 
there is no room for allocations with Pareto-optimality.45  In the case of a 
bilateral monopoly, Pareto-optimality is trivial, but distribution becomes a 
major issue due to the presence of multiple equilibria.46 
A disproportionate part of the debate over the Coase Theorem revolves 
around the assumption of zero transaction costs.  This is unfortunate 
because the central assumption is not whether there are zero transaction 
costs but, rather, whether we are looking at a two-commodity world or an n-
commodity economy.  In the next section we examine what happens when 
this two-commodity assumption is relaxed. 
II.   THE GENERAL CASE: N-COMMODITY MODELS 
In a two-commodity world, the only prices involved pertain to those two 
commodities.47  This is why, in examining Coase’s examples, the only 
parameters taken into consideration by both agents are their indifference 
curves and the relative price of the two commodities involved in the 
transaction.48  This is a heavy-handed assumption. 
In a typical Coasean example, when a locomotive emits sparks and burns 
farmers’ fields adjacent to the railway, the railroad owner may be compelled 
or required to compensate the farmers for their losses.  But, how much is 
the railroad owner willing to pay?  Or, should the farmer pay the railroad to 
help prevent the burning fields?  Answering these questions, however, not 
only depends on the price of the wheat in the fields and the cost of installing 
a shield to prevent sparks from burning the fields, but also on the prices of a 
myriad of other commodities and services relevant to the cost structures of 
railways and farming, as well as on the prices of all the other commodities 
that railway owners and farmers are willing to buy and sell.  In fact, the 
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answers depend on the cost structures of alternative investments that 
railway owners and farmers may want to consider. 
In economic theory, the parameters of the demand and supply functions 
are not only the prices of the commodities directly involved in each 
market—the parameters also include the prices of all the other commodities.  
The reason for this is that agents need to take into account their total income 
in order to have an accurate measure of their budget constraints.  Total 
income depends on the prices of the commodities in the original 
endowments of each agent.  This is why general equilibrium theory is so 
appealing: it is supposed to be capable of dealing with the general case of 
systems of prices in interdependent markets.  Likewise, this is why the 
explanatory power of partial equilibrium and a bilateral monopoly is so 
limited.  
We have noted that the critical assumption of the Coase Theorem is not 
that transaction costs are zero, but rather that we are in a market in which all 
other prices are irrelevant.  This assumption restricts the theorem to the least 
interesting of cases (bilateral monopolies) and, in accepting the assumption, 
we disregard a series of difficult problems that economic theory has failed 
to solve.  This is also a very problematic assumption because it is a theory 
that rests on the premise that markets allocate resources efficiently.  The 
reason for this is that the notion of efficiency attains its full stature in a 
general model where n-commodities coexist in interdependent markets.  
And this is where modern economic theory has failed to provide a model 
that shows how market forces lead an economy to an equilibrium—and an 
efficient—allocation.  We now turn to examine two of the most serious 
problems of general equilibrium theory: arbitraging and the dynamic 
formation of equilibrium prices. 
A.  Arbitrages and Price Systems 
Examining the complications that arise when dealing with a three-
commodity economy will shed light on how the Coasean world of economic 
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theory is restricted to the simplistic and misleading two-commodity 
economy.  To examine this issue we start by considering what happens 
when the simple two-commodity assumption is relaxed.  Here we discover 
the first problem: arbitraging is now a possibility and agents can opt for 
indirect exchanges.  
When we discussed the context of a bilateral monopoly, we excluded the 
possibility that agents could engage in arbitrages—a possibility that was 
excluded by the fact that in a two-commodity world there is only one 
relative price.  That fact is eliminated when considering the more complex 
three-commodity economy.  In general, when there is a move to an n-
commodity economy there are  n(n – 1)/2 relative prices.49  
In a three-commodity model, there is a new phenomenon where 
commodities can be traded through direct or indirect exchanges.50  In 
indirect trading, commodities are obtained in order to use them as a means 
of exchange.  For example, consider three commodities, each one owned by 
one agent: commodity (A) can be traded for (B), or the owner of (A) can 
first trade it for (C) and then proceed to exchange (C) against (B).  Benetti 
has carried out the complete analysis of this problem and distills its deep 
theoretical implications.51   
According to Benetti, the price of one commodity exchanged directly 
with another commodity may or may not coincide with the price when 
indirect trades occur.  If the price of these two paths does not coincide, 
gains are likely to take place.  This opens the door to arbitraging, a very 
important phenomenon that was absent from the two-commodity model. 
The problems arising from the transition from a two- to a three-
commodity world were first analyzed by Walras in the following terms.52  
There are now three “special” markets as commodities are traded pairwise: 
[A:B], [A:C], and [B:C].  In each of these markets, let pa,b (pb,a), pa,c (pc,a), 
and pb,c (pc,b) be the prices obtained in the direct exchanges between 
commodities (A), (B), and (C).  The prices in parentheses are the 
reciprocals, such that pa,b = 1/pb,a.53 
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In this context, there are two prices for each commodity; the first price 
corresponds to direct trading and the second price corresponds to indirect 
trading.54  For example, pa,b is the price when trading takes place directly 
between commodities (A) and (B).  But agents can resort to indirect 
exchanges.  Suppose one agent trades (A) for (C) and then proceeds to trade 
(C) against (B).  In that case, the relation between prices obtained directly 
and indirectly can be expressed in the following manner:  
 
  pa,c = α pa,b / pc,b      (Equation 1) 
 
When α = 1, the prices of direct and indirect exchanges coincide.55  
Walras shows that when the price of any two commodities is proportional to 
their prices expressed in a third commodity, there is a price system in a very 
precise sense—there is only one price for each commodity, and, regardless 
of the trajectory of transactions that is followed, the end result is always the 
same.56  This result occurs when markets are connected through a set of 
consistent prices.  Agents are indifferent to the path of transactions—they 
can go to either direct or indirect exchanges, and the result will be identical.  
When markets are connected through this price system, there are no 
opportunities for arbitraging.  But what happens when we have a situation 
in which α ≠ 1?  Walras provides an example with the following set of 
prices (reciprocals in parentheses):57 
 
pc,b = 4 (pb,c = .25) 
pc,a = 6 (pa,c = 0.166) 
pb,a = 2 (pa,b = 0.5) 
 
In direct trading, one unit of (C) obtains six units of (A).  However, the 
result is different if we proceed through indirect exchanges: one unit of (C) 
buys four units of (B), and these four units of (B) can purchase eight units 
of (A).  Evidently, the owner of commodity (C) has an interest in using the 
 Coasean Fictions 585 
VOLUME 5 • ISSUE 2 • 2007 
indirect route to obtain (A) and will go to make an offer to owners of 
commodity (B).  But in direct trading, one unit of (B) purchases 0.25 units 
of commodity (C).  Going through indirect exchange, one unit of (B) buys 
two units of (A) and these can be traded for 0.332 units of commodity (C).  
The owner of commodity (B) can obtain a gain through indirect exchanges 
and will, therefore, proceed to meet agents with commodity (A). 
Finally, in direct trading, one unit of (A) buys 0.5 units of commodity 
(B).  The result is different in indirect exchanges: one unit of (A) provides 
0.166 units of (C), and that quantity can be traded for 0.66 units of (B).  
Agents with commodity (A) will prefer the indirect route to obtain (B). 
 
Figure 2 





The end result is that an agent with commodity (A) will refuse to trade 
with an agent with commodity (B), while an agent with commodity (C) will 
refuse offers from agents with commodity (A), and agents with commodity 
(B) will reject trades with agents making an offer with commodity (C).  In 
this example, when α > 1, the movement in the diagram follows a 
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counterclockwise sense (if instead α < 1, the movement would follow a 
clockwise direction). 
The direction of the arrows in Figure 2 indicates the direction of offers 
necessary to engage in a trade.  As can be seen, a new problem arises in the 
absence of a price system (α = 1) because there will be no trading at all.  An 
agent with commodity (B), for example, will go to the market where direct 
trades between commodities (A) and (B) take place and will find that 
market empty.  This means that there will be a supply of commodity (B) 
against commodity (A), but there will be no reciprocal demand.  In general 
terms, in all markets there will be supplies but no demands (and reciprocal 
demands but no supplies).  Ultimately, there is no reason to expect that α = 
1 and that a price system—a consistent set of prices—will prevail.  And 
when α ≠ 1, there are incentives for speculation.  In strict terms, speculation 
is defined as behavior that tends to take advantage of inconsistencies in the 
price system (or between price systems).  This is why the idea of “buy 
cheap, sell dearly” is a key principle of speculation. 
When a market process gets started, why should prices be consistent?  
Walras tackles this problem by assuming the existence of a price system, 
which is equivalent to assuming the following relationship:58  
 
Pa,b · Pb,c · Pc,a = 1      (Equation 2) 
 
This assumption (which implies α = 1) allows Walras to eliminate 
arbitrages and to set the stage for the market process to start operating.59  
Working with a price system means there is only one price for each 
commodity: regardless of the path of transactions, the end result is always 
the same.  This eliminates all incentives for speculative behavior, but it also 
constitutes an assumption that is very difficult to justify. 
This is the tradition in price-formation analysis—a price system is 
assumed even before the market process begins.  Benetti argues that the 
reason for this indefensible assumption is that if arbitrages are not 
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eliminated, the dynamic market process collapses because the price-
adjustment process cannot function.  In every market there will always be a 
positive demand of one good and a negative supply of that same good (or 
vice-versa).60  This means that there will be no encounters between 
prospective traders.  Of course, it could be advanced that with only three 
traders, the traders could rapidly decipher what is occurring and 
independently establish a price system.  That, however, is not an adequate 
answer for a general situation where many agents and n-commodity settings 
exist, as it will not be possible for the agents to decipher such a condition. 
It is now possible to see why the simplifying assumptions of the Coasean 
world rely on bilateral monopolies.  This fiction allows Coase to hide all 
prices from the agents in his examples—except the prices of the two 
commodities that are involved in his examples—and thus prevent the agents 
from engaging in arbitrages.  It is evident, though, that when agents engage 
in arbitraging the simple world of bilateral monopolies falls apart.  If the 
Coase Theorem relies upon the notion that equilibrium is attained through a 
dynamic process of negotiations, then it would make sense—and it would 
be realistic—to permit arbitraging by agents.  However, as we have seen, 
the adjustment process that could conceivably lead to equilibrium breaks 
down once we introduce the possibility of arbitraging.  In light of this 
reality, Coase prefers the simplistic and less interesting world of a bilateral 
monopoly.  It is ironic that the L&E movement rests on the premise that 
economic theory is robust, but the examples that are used rely exclusively 
on cases of a bilateral monopoly—cases that exclude arbitraging.  In so 
doing, the followers of L&E turn their back on the general case that is the 
main objective of modern economic theory. 
B.  The Auctioneer, Stability, Gross Substitutes, and Money 
Law and economics is based on the notion that markets allocate resources 
in an efficient manner.  For example, Cooter states that “a central insight of 
microeconomics is that free exchange tends to move resources to their 
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highest valued use, in which case the allocation of resources is said to be 
Pareto-efficient.”61  The rest of this article examines the validity of this 
“insight.” 
Just how do market forces lead economies to equilibrium allocations?  
This is a critical question for those who believe in the efficiency of the 
market.  In equilibrium, a vector of prices, p*, ensures that supply equals 
demand in every market.62  How are the prices in p* formed?  To examine 
this question we must refer to general equilibrium theory, a powerful 
construct first proposed by Leon Walras (1952) and developed through the 
works of John Hicks, Paul Samuelson, Kenneth Arrow, Gerard Debreu, and 
many others.  General equilibrium theory (GET) is concerned with the role 
of the price system in attaining equilibrium allocations that make individual 
consumption and production plans compatible.  The central question for 
GET is how equilibrium prices are formed. 
Pareto-efficiency is attained when the economy reaches a position of 
general equilibrium.  The demonstration of this was carried out by 
Samuelson through the two fundamental theorems of welfare economics.63  
The first theorem states that any competitive equilibrium is a Pareto-
efficient allocation of resources whose proof requires rather weak 
assumptions.64  The second theorem states that any Pareto-efficient 
allocation can be sustained by a competitive equilibrium.65  A corollary of 
this is that efficiency is a property of equilibrium allocations only.  Outside 
of equilibrium allocations, it is not possible to claim that markets allocate 
resources efficiently. 
An equilibrium allocation for an n-commodity economy is represented by 
an n-dimensional vector of quantities of commodities supplied y*, an n-
dimensional vector of quantities demanded x*, and an n-dimensional vector 
of prices p*.66  At prices p*, supply equals demand for every commodity at 
the same time: yi* = xi* for all i.67  Because the quantities supplied and 
demanded are the result of maximizing behavior of agents, the allocation is 
a Pareto-optimum. 
 Coasean Fictions 589 
VOLUME 5 • ISSUE 2 • 2007 
Although economic theory pays more attention to equilibrium 
allocations, the critical question is just how these positions are reached 
through the interplay of market forces.  For example, Walras thought that 
this was the central question for economic theory.68  There are two classes 
of models that have been developed to answer this question, and to this date 
the results are quite unsatisfactory.  Thus, the belief of Coase and his 
followers on the virtues of market systems, in terms of attaining efficiency 
allocations, is not justified. 
The two classes of models differ in how trading is treated outside of 
equilibrium positions.69  In the first class, trading is not authorized outside 
of equilibrium.  Price formation proceeds through a “groping” process.  
Prices are adjusted until the difference between supply and demand (the 
excess demand) is annulled.  Once equilibrium is attained, transactions can 
proceed at the equilibrium prices, and the new allocation is Pareto-efficient.  
With respect to the second class, models are called “trading process 
models” because they allow for trading to take place outside of 
equilibrium.70  In these models, the economy-wide allocation changes 
through the price formation process.71  The final equilibrium point is path-
dependent: there are as many equilibria as there are exchange trajectories.72 
The two classes of models share one common trait—in each class the 
agents are assumed to play a passive role vis-à-vis prices.  In other words, 
the agents are price-takers, which is logical because the models were 
developed to try to prove that competitive market forces do lead an 
economy to an equilibrium (in which Pareto-optimality exists).  However, 
this left an unresolved problem, first identified by Koopmans: if in this 
model all agents are price-takers, then who adjusts prices?73  
Mathematically, the problem was represented through a system of 
differential equations.  For each price, the adjustment process is a function 





  (Equation 3) 
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In this equation Zi is the excess demand for commodity i (the difference 
between Di and Si, the demand and supply of commodity i, respectively).  
This equation states that price adjustment proceeds through a function that 
respects the sign of excess demands: because of the law of supply and 
demand, when demand is greater than supply, the price must rise.  
Similarly, if it is less than supply, it must fall.  When supply equals demand, 
there is no change because that price is considered to be an equilibrium 
price: dp/dt = 0.75 
Although it is reasonable to assume that when demand exceeds supply 
then prices will increase, when one also assumes perfect competition and 
price-taking behavior, how exactly are prices changed?  This is a well-
known problem in economic theory: exactly whose behavior is the equation 
intended to represent?  As will be seen, the answer to that question is 
unanimously considered unsatisfactory.76  
The general equilibrium theory equation (3) represents the behavior of a 
special agent called the auctioneer—this is the most important point of the 
equilibrium theory.77  This agent is not a consumer, nor a producer, but an 
entity charged with the role of adjusting prices in accordance with the law 
of supply and demand.78  The auctioneer collects information from all 
agents, calculates aggregate supply and demand for each commodity, and 
considers the sign of the excess demand: if the result is positive, the price 
increases, and if the result is negative, the price diminishes or remains 
constant.79  The auctioneer then announces a new set of prices, and all 
agents recalculate their supplies and demands while a new iteration takes 
place.80 
It is important to note that the auctioneer announces a system of prices.  
As mentioned above, using a system of prices (pa,b = pa,c/pb,c with α = 1) is 
equivalent to working in a setting with only one price for each commodity 
even before the market mechanism starts operating.  This is a restrictive 
assumption, but it is quite necessary for the functioning of the general 
equilibrium model.  Because all agents calculate their supplies and demands 
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with the same set of prices, the auctioneer can aggregate these quantities 
and calculate the excess demand, and from there the auctioneer can proceed 
to adjust prices.  If no price system exists, multiple prices would arise, the 
quantities of individual agents’ supply and demand would not be consistent, 
and the whole process would break down.  Working with price systems is 
an abuse from the standpoint of the theory’s objective, but is essential for 
the model to operate. 
Of course, the presence of the auctioneer is highly problematic.  The 
problematic presence of the auctioneer has been recognized by all the 
theoreticians that have developed general equilibrium theory.  Because the 
auctioneer aggregates information that is supposed to exist on a 
decentralized basis, this fictitious agent contradicts the objective of general 
equilibrium theory.81  The model is supposed to represent the dynamics of a 
private, decentralized, market economy.  Instead, the presence of the 
auctioneer, which behaves like a central authority, takes the model closer to 
the realm of a centrally planned economy.  This fictitious agent is required 
in both classes of models, with or without trading out of equilibrium 
positions.82 
The problems do not stop here.  Even if we accept this strange fiction in 
the model of a market economy, we still have to adjust the form of the 
supply and demand functions in such a way that prices converge to their 
equilibrium position (and excess demands become zero as all markets 
clear).  In the first class of models, where trading is not allowed outside of 
equilibrium positions, the mathematical tools that are used translate 
themselves into arbitrary and highly restrictive assumptions.  These 
assumptions are needed to modify the form of the supply and demand 
functions in such a way that convergence to equilibrium becomes a 
possibility.  One of these assumptions is that all commodities are gross 
substitutes (GS).83  Two commodities are said to be GS when a rise in the 
price of one leads to an increase in the demand for the other (coffee and tea 
are a good example).  If all commodities are GS, it is possible to use a 
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mathematical theorem that allows us to state that market forces (as 
represented by the auctioneer) lead the economy to equilibrium and Pareto-
optimality.  The assumption is not only an ad-hoc condition, but is also 
quite extreme and has been unanimously declared unsatisfactory.84 
Another assumption is that at the aggregate level the weak axiom of 
revealed preferences (WARP) holds.  This axiom states that agents who 
have chosen a bundle of commodities, Q, when they could afford (at the 
going prices) bundle R, will only choose R when prices have changed and 
they can no longer afford Q.85  The axiom makes perfect sense at the 
individual level, but it does not hold when using aggregate demand 
functions.  The assumption of WARP at the market level is also used to 
prove global stability, but the price is too high. 
At the end of the 1950s, the analyses of Kenneth J. Arrow, Leonid 
Hurwicz, and H.D. Block were able to prove global stability using either GS 
or WARP.86  They ventured a conjecture that in general, a tâtonnement 
process—where no trading takes place before equilibrium is reached—is 
globally stable.87  The only restrictions that the process had to respect were 
acceptable because they were part and parcel of the general equilibrium 
model (such as Walras’ Law and homogeneity of degree zero for the excess 
demand functions).88  However, a paper published by Herbert Scarf showed 
through the use of counterexamples that the general equilibrium was 
unstable once those restrictive assumptions were removed.89  Later, papers 
by Rolf R. Mantel, Hugo Sonnenschein, and Gerard Debreu confirmed the 
fact that additional assumptions on excess demand functions will always be 
needed in order to prove global stability.90  Their work is known as the 
Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu (SMD) theorem and shows that the properties 
of individual excess demand functions (Walras’ Law, continuity and 
homogeneity of degree zero) that are transferred to aggregate excess 
demand functions are not enough to ensure compliance with the weak 
axiom of revealed preferences.91  The implication is devastating for stability 
(the formation of equilibrium prices) in the context of general equilibrium 
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models.  The SMD theorem states that the dynamics of price changes in a 
general equilibrium model can behave in very strange manners—the 
theorem is one of “anything goes.”  The bottom line here is that it is not 
possible to prove the stability of price dynamics, and convergence to 
equilibrium, without ad-hoc and restrictive conditions on the excess demand 
functions.  This conclusion is most unfortunate for those who, like Coase, 
believe there is a theory somewhere showing that the competitive forces of 
the market lead to equilibrium and efficiency. 
Non-tâtonnement models abandon the assumption that trade does not take 
place out of equilibrium (that is, it occurs during the price formation 
process).92  These models were developed by Takashi Negishi, Hirofumi 
Uzawa, F.H. Hahn, and Franklin Fisher, and do not require the restrictive 
assumptions needed to ensure stability in tâtonnement processes (i.e., gross 
substitutability or WARP).93  They do, however, share with those models 
the presence of the uncomfortable auctioneer.  Also, as with tâtonnement 
processes, trading models do not allow for actual consumption and 
production to take place until equilibrium has been reached.94  
These models are path-dependent because at each stage in the price-
adjustment process, the stock of commodities possessed by individual 
agents changes, and the new demand plans are affected by these changes.  
Although it could be argued that this is more realistic, it entails a new 
problem: uniqueness of equilibrium is lost.  This is an unwelcome result 
from the standpoint of comparative statistics, which is a key dimension in 
economic analysis.95  This is why these models have not received the 
acceptance one would expect given the fact that they do not need the 
restrictive assumptions of GS or WARP. 
An additional problem in general equilibrium models makes itself highly 
visible in this class of processes: the absence of money.  Everything that has 
been stated up until this moment refers to theoretical models in which there 
is no money.  Prices are relative prices, described by rates of substitution 
between commodities.96  They are not prices expressed in terms of fiat 
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money units.97  It is surprising to realize that these models—which may be 
very ingenious intellectual constructs with a large dose of mathematical 
complexity—are, in reality, models of barter economies.  The reason for 
this involves deep theoretical problems.98  The absence of money poses a 
serious difficulty in non-tâtonnement models because they are based on the 
so-called “orderly markets assumption”: for each commodity there exists a 
market such that after trading, there may be unsatisfied sellers or unsatisfied 
buyers of that commodity, but not both.99  This assumption may sound 
reasonable because we know that buyers and sellers look for each other in a 
market.  The problem, however, is that for these transactions to take place, a 
medium of exchange is required.  That fact is not easily resolved because 
the introduction of money poses its own unresolved problems.100  The main 
problem is that the purchasing power of money has to remain positive at all 
times in order to satisfy the needs of the model.  Yet, when introducing fiat 
money into the picture, it is difficult to guarantee that it will always have a 
strictly positive price (i.e., positive purchasing power). 
That money cannot be introduced into general equilibrium models is a 
disturbing fact.  Coase and his followers do not seem to be aware of this and 
have always ignored this fundamental difficulty in pure market theory.  This 
ignorance explains their loyalty to the belief that, somewhere, there is 
strong and consistent scientific proof of the efficiency properties of markets. 
We have shown that there is no rational proof—and thus no scientific 
validity—for the notion that the dynamics of market systems lead to 
efficient (equilibrium) allocations.  Many of the critical assumptions used in 
general equilibrium models are so outrageous that it is difficult to 
understand how some would think that the rigor and soundness of economic 
theory can enrich legal analysis and practice—part of the explanation rests 
in downright ignorance of economic theory. 
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III.   CONCLUSION: AN APPRAISAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 
Examining the Coase Theorem relies on a critical analysis of economic 
theory.  The fundamental shortcomings of the most developed theory of the 
market, general equilibrium theory, as well as the restrictions imposed by 
the use of partial equilibrium and cases of a bilateral monopoly, undermine 
the assertions of the Coase Theorem.  In the case of a bilateral monopoly, 
this construct involves serious distributional problems, and the invariance 
component of the theorem is seriously called into question.  In addition, it is 
possible that the negotiations process may stop when mutually beneficial 
transactions take place outside of the contract curve.  In those cases, social 
efficiency in the restricted Pareto-optimum sense will not be the outcome. 
The simplicity of the bilateral monopoly cases used to illustrate the Coase 
Theorem is indeed misleading.  In reality, a bilateral monopoly is used as an 
artificial device to camouflage two essential points.  First, references to 
dynamic price-formation processes require working in a multi-commodity 
setting.  When agents make decisions in terms of supply and demand of one 
commodity, they take into account many prices in the economy, and not just 
the price of that single commodity.  This is due to the fact that they have to 
consider their budget constraints, which may involve many commodities; 
this is also why supply and demand functions in the general theory of 
markets have as parameters an n-dimensional vector of the prices of the n-
commodities. 
The second point is that using a bilateral monopoly framework allows 
L&E to abstract from all other prices, therefore preventing agents to engage 
in arbitraging operations.  This is important, as arbitraging would be 
disastrous for the Coase Theorem because the negotiating process would 
not necessarily lead to any kind of efficiency allocation. 
Faith in the idea that markets allocate resources efficiently is severely 
shaken by the set of difficulties in general equilibrium theory discussed in 
this article.  The shortcomings of general equilibrium theory in stability 
theory should alert anyone tempted by the L&E movement and its 
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applicability to fields of legal practice.  The bottom line is that we do not 
have a theory showing how, if at all, markets reach equilibrium allocations.  
Because efficiency, in terms of Pareto-optimality, is an attribute only of 
equilibrium allocations, very serious negative implications exist for anyone 
claiming that markets allocate resources efficiently. 
We have concentrated our critique of L&E based on the fact that 
economic theory is in a very sad state.  Proponents of L&E seem to ignore 
this, appearing instead to believe that there exists somewhere a robust 
theoretical construct that satisfactorily explains how markets allocate 
resources efficiently—this article has shown such faith to be groundless.  
This should be enough to dismiss L&E as another example of the triumph 
of ideology over science.  In addition, the extreme version of L&E 
transforms justice into a commodity and represents a disturbing backward 
movement in social thought.  The critiques raised in this article should also 
suffice to call into question the idea that the main objective of legal systems 
is efficiency, and that efficiency is attained through the market system.  
There are no grounds to believe in the efficiency of the market system. 
One final thought on the role of mathematics is important.  In its 
development, economics as a discipline has been obsessed with the use of 
mathematical models to build a theory of competitive markets.  The only 
function for the very awkward assumptions mentioned above—for example, 
GS or WARP—was to allow the theoretician to have access to certain 
mathematical theorems.  Functioning in this manner, economic theory has 
sacrificed the construction of relevant economic concepts for the sake of 
using mathematical tools.  This is not how scientific discourse should 
advance, and the followers of L&E are probably not aware of this.  In fact, 
they may have fallen victim to the illusion of scientific rigor conferred by 
the use, and abuse, of mathematics. 
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